Introduction
Since the discovery of zero-determinant strategies for iterated games by Press & Dyson [1] , there has been a growing interest in the set of possible pay-offs that can be achieved against a fixed strategy. Imagine that Alice uses a particular strategy, while Bob can try out any conceivable strategy. The resulting set of pay-offs for both Alice and Bob define the 'feasible region' of Alice's strategy. If Alice uses a so-called zerodeterminant strategy [1] , then the feasible region is a line. In general, the feasible region is a two-dimensional Figure 1 . Feasible region (grey) for a strategy with p •• = (0.7881, 0.8888, 0.4686, 0.0792) when R = 3, S = 0, T = 5 and P = 1. The light blue region depicts the set of all pay-off pairs that can be achieved in the iterated game, i.e. the convex hull of the points (R, R), (S, T), (P, P) and (T, S). The feasible region of p can be characterized as the convex hull of 11 points, corresponding to those opponent-strategies, q, appearing next to each black dot. In this instance, five of these points already fall inside of the convex hull of the remaining six. However, one cannot remove one of these 11 points without destroying this characterization for some game-strategy pair. (Online version in colour.) convex subset of the feasible pay-off region of the game (figure 1). Using the geometric intuition put forth by Press & Dyson [1] , subsequent work has explored strategies that generate twodimensional feasible regions, defined by linear inequalities rather than strict equations [2] [3] [4] . However, a general description of what this region looks like, as it relates to the type of strategy played, is currently not well understood. In this study, we characterize the feasible regions for the well-known class of memory-one strategies [5] and consider their relationships to those of a new class of 'reactive learning strategies'.
Iterated games have many applications across the social sciences and biology, and with them has come a proliferation of strategy classes of various complexities [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . The type of strategy a player uses for dealing with repeated encounters depends on many factors, including the cognitive capacity of the player and the nature of the underlying 'one-shot' (or 'stage') games. In applications to theoretical biology, the most well-studied type of strategy is known as 'memoryone' because it takes into account the outcome of only the previous encounter when determining how to play in the next round [5, 11] . This class of strategies, while forming only a small subset of all possible ways to play an iterated game [12] , has several advantages over more complicated strategies. They permit rich behaviour in iterated play, such as punishment for exploitation and reward for cooperation [5, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] ; but, owing to their simple memory requirements, they are also straightforward to implement in practice and analyse mathematically.
Memory, however, can apply to more than just the players' actions in the previous round. Since the action a player chooses in any particular encounter is typically chosen stochastically rather than deterministically, a player can also take into account how they chose their previous
Memory-one strategies
Consider an iterated game between two players, X and Y. In every round, each player chooses an action from the set {C, D} (cooperate or defect). They receive pay-offs based on the values in the matrix Over many rounds, these pay-offs are averaged to arrive at an expected pay-off for each player. Whereas an action specifies the behaviour of a player in one particular encounter, a strategy specifies how a player behaves over the course of many encounters. One of the simplest and best-studied strategies for iterated games is a memory-one strategy [5] , which for player X is defined as follows: for every (x, y) ∈ {C, D} 2 observed as action outcomes of a given round, X devises a mixed action p xy ∈ [0, 1] for the next round. The notation p xy indicates that this mixed action depends on the (pure) actions of both players in the previous round, not how they arrived at those actions (e.g. by generating an action probabilistically). The term 'strategy' is reserved for the players' behaviours in the iterated game.
Let Mem 1 X be the space of all memory-one strategies for player X in an iterated game. With just two actions, C and D, we have Mem 1 X = [0, 1] × [0, 1] 4 , i.e. the space of all (p 0 , p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) ∈ [0, 1] 5 . A pair of memory-one strategies, p := (p 0 , p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) and q := (q 0 , q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ), for X and Y, respectively, yield a Markov chain on the space of all action pairs, {C, D} 2 , whose transition matrix is
and whose initial distribution is
). If p xy , q xy ∈ (0, 1) for every x, y ∈ {C, D}, then this chain is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution, μ(p, q), which is independent of μ 0 . In particular, the expected pay-offs, π X (p, q) = μ(p, q) · (R, S, T, P) and π Y (p, q) = μ(p, q) · (R, T, S, P), are independent of p 0 and q 0 . In this case, π X and π Y are functions of just the response probabilities, p •• := (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) and q •• := (q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ). A useful way of thinking about a strategy is through its feasible region, i.e. the set of all possible pay-off pairs (for X and Y) that can be achieved against it. For any memory-one strategy p of X, let C p := π Y p, q , π X p,∈Mem 1 X (2.3) be this feasible region. (Note that, if X uses a memory-one strategy, then it suffices to assume that Y uses a memory-one strategy by the results of Press & Dyson [1] .) This subset of the feasible region represents the 'geometry' of strategy p in the sense that it captures all possible pay-off pairs against an opponent.
In this section, we show that the feasible region for p ∈ Mem 1 X with p •• ∈ (0, 1) 4 is characterized by playing p against the following 11 strategies: (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 1). In other words, C(p) is the convex hull of 11 points (figure 1). Therefore, any p ∈ Mem 1 X generates a simple polygon in R 2 whose number of extreme points is uniformly bounded over all game-strategy pairs, ((R, S, T, P), p). 
The set of points (π Y (p, q), π X (p, q)), where p •• = (0.7876, 0.9856, 0.4095, 0.0301) and q •• = (q CC , 0.9963, 0.0166, 0.9879) as q CC varies between 0 (green) and 1 (red) in uniform increments of 0.01. The resulting points all fall along a line; however, they are not uniformly distributed even though the distribution of q CC is uniform. Parameters: R = 3, S = 0, T = 5 and P = 1. (Online version in colour.)
or the determinant formula of Press & Dyson [1] ). For example, suppose that x = y = C. Then, with
one has π Y p, q , π X p, q = L q CC π Y p, q; q CC = 0 , π X p, q; q CC = 0
Provided (π Y (p, (q; q CC = 0)), π X (p, (q; q CC = 0))) = (π Y (p, (q; q CC = 1)), π X (p, (q; q CC = 1))), we also have L(0) = 1 and L(1) = 0. Moreover, one can check that, under this condition, L (q CC ) is nowhere equal to 0, and 0 L(q CC ) 1 for every q CC ∈ [0, 1]. The other cases with x, y ∈ {C, D} are analogous.
Remark 2.2.
Even when q xy is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the corresponding points in the feasible region need not be uniformly distributed between the endpoints corresponding to q xy = 0 and q xy = 1, respectively (figure 2). This result is therefore somewhat different from the analogous situation of playing against a mixed action in a stage game, where, for a payoff function u : S X × S Y → R 2 and mixed action σ X ∈ (S X ) and σ Y ∈ (S Y ), one has u(σ X , σ Y ) = y∈S Y u(σ X , y) dσ Y (y) due to linearity. Proposition 2.3. For any p ∈ Mem 1 X with p •• ∈ (0, 1) 4 , C(p) is the convex hull of the following 11 points:
Proof. Press & Dyson [1] show that if X uses a memory-one strategy, p, then any strategy of the opponent, y, can be replaced by a memory-one strategy, q, without changing the pay-offs to X and Y; thus, if X uses a memory-one strategy, one may assume without a loss of generality that Y also uses a memory-one strategy. If p •• ∈ (0, 1) 4 and q ∈ Mem 1 X , the fact that (π Y (p, q), π X (p, q)) can be written as a convex combination of the 16 points {(π Y (p, q ), π X (p, q ))} q •• ∈{0,1} 4 then follows immediately from lemma 2.1. Moreover, the points corresponding to (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0, 0) are the same, as are the points corresponding to (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 1); thus, we can eliminate four points. Furthermore, we can remove the point associated with ( Table 1 . For each point, π (i 1 ,i 2 ,i 3 ,i 3 )
X,Y
, the feasible region C(p) cannot (in general) be expressed as the convex hull of the remaining 10 points different from π (i 1 ,i 2 ,i 3 ,i 3 )
. That is, each row gives (i) one of the 11 points of which C is the convex hull and (ii) an example of a game-strategy pair for which π (i 1 ,i 2 ,i 3 ,i 3 )
is an extreme point of C(p). because it lies on the line connecting the points associated with (0, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 1). One can easily check that the remaining 11 points have the following property: if point i is removed, then there exist R, S, T, P and p for which C(p) is not the convex hull of the 10 points different from i (table 1) . Thus, for a general p and pay-off matrix, all 11 of these points are required. Remark 2.5. One needs all 11 of these points for general R, S, T, P and p. However, for any particular game-strategy pair, it is often the case that several of these points are unnecessary because they lie within the convex hull of some other subset of these 11 points; they are typically not all extreme points of C(p).
Reactive learning strategies
In a traditional memory-one strategy, X's probability of playing C depends on the realized actions of the two players, x and y. However, X can observe more than just their pure action against the opponent's; they also know how they arrived at x (i.e. they know the mixed action, σ X , that resulted in x in the previous round). Of course, X need not be able to see Y's mixed action, but reactive strategies memory-one strategies Figure 3 . The space of memory-one strategies, Mem 1 X , as it relates to the space of reactive learning strategies, RL X . Both sets contain the space of reactive strategies [22] , which take into account only the last move, y, of the opponent. Whereas a memoryone strategy takes into account the last pure action of X as well, x, a reactive learning strategy uses X's last mixed action, σ X ∈ [0, 1]. After each round, a reactive learning strategy uses y to update X's probability of cooperating. RL X is 'larger' than Mem 1 X in the sense that there is an injective map Mem 1 X → RL X that is not surjective. (Online version in colour.)
they can still observe the pure action Y played. Therefore, an alternative notion of a memory-one strategy for player X could be defined as follows: after X plays σ X ∈ [0, 1] and Y plays y, X then chooses a new action based on the distribution p * σ X y ∈ [0, 1]. In this formulation, p * is a map from [0, 1] × {C, D} to [0, 1]. We refer to such a map, p * , together with X's initial probability of playing C, p 0 , as a 'reactive learning strategy' for player X (figure 3) .
In other words, in contrast to Mem 1 X = [0, 1] × [0, 1] 4 , which can be alternatively described as
we define the space of reactive learning strategies as
where [0, 1] indicates the space of mixed actions for X and {C, D} indicates the action space for Y. Although [0, 1] is a much larger space than {C, D}, the updates of mixed actions can be easier to specify using reactive learning strategies since they allow for adaptive modification of an existing mixed action (without the need to devise a new mixed action from scratch after every observed history of play).
Example 3.1. Suppose that player X starts by playing C and D with equal probability, i.e. p 0 = 1/2. For fixed η ∈ [0, 1] (the 'learning rate'), cooperation from the opponent leads to p * σ X C = (1 − η)σ X + η while defection leads to p * σ X D = (1 − η)σ X . Thus, a long pattern of exploitation by Y leads X to defect more often. On the other hand, X does not immediately forgive such behaviour but rather requires Y to cooperate repeatedly to bring X back up to higher levels of cooperation. For example, if X starts with p 0 and Y defects times in a row, then X subsequently cooperates with probability (1 − η) p 0 . In order to bring X's probability of cooperation above p 0 once again, Y must then cooperate for T rounds, where
We refer to this strategy as LTFT because it pushes a player's cooperation probability in the direction of the opponent's last move ( figure 4 ). In this way, a reactive learning strategy can encode more complicated behaviour than a memory-one strategy. Conversely, memory-one Figure 4 . 'Learning tit-for-tat (LTFT)' , an analogue of tit-for-tat (TFT) within the space of reactive learning strategies. LTFT is the function of two parameters, p 0 (the initial mixed action) and η (the learning rate). Player X initially plays C with probability p 0 . In all subsequent rounds, if X played C with probability σ X and Y played C (resp. D) in the previous round, in the next round X plays C with probability p *
. At the corners lie the strategies ALLD (always defect), ALLC (always cooperate), TFT (tit-for-tat) and STFT (suspicious tit-for-tat).
strategies can also encode behaviour not captured by reactive learning strategies, which we discuss further in §3c.
(a) Linear reactive learning strategies
A pertinent question at this point is whether there is a 'natural' map from Mem 1 X to RL X . Let (p 0 , p •• ) = (p 0 , p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) be a memory-one strategy. If (p 0 , p * ) is the corresponding reactive learning strategy, then the first requirement we impose is p 0 = p 0 . If σ X = 1, then X plays C with probability one. It is therefore reasonable to insist that p * 1y = p Cy . Similarly, X plays D with probability one when σ X = 0, and we insist that p * 0y = p Dy . Suppose now that σ X and σ X are two mixed actions for X. If Y plays y ∈ {C, D}, then the responses for X corresponding to σ X and σ X are p * σ X y and p * σ X y , respectively. If X plays σ X with probability w ∈ [0, 1] and σ X with probability 1 − w, then it is also natural to insist that the response is p * σ X y with probability w and p * σ X y with probability 1 − w. Thus, for any σ X ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ {C, D}, with these requirements p * can be written uniquely in terms of p
Using this map, one can naturally identify Mem 1 X with the set of linear reactive learning strategies, LRL X ⊆ RL X , consisting of those functions p * : [0, 1] × {C, D} → [0, 1] for which there exist a, b, c, d ∈ R with 
then there exists no (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) ∈ [0, 1] 4 mapping to p * provided a = c or b = d.
(b) Stationary distributions
Suppose that (p 0 , p * ) and (q 0 , q * ) are reactive learning strategies for X and Y, respectively. These strategies generate a Markov chain on the (infinite) space {C, D} 2 × [0, 1] 2 with transition probabilities between ((x, y),
(3.7)
To simplify notation, we can also denote the right-hand side of this equation by p * σ X y (x )q * σ Y x (y ). If ν is a stationary distribution of this chain, then, for any ((x, y),
In general, ν is difficult to give explicitly. However, it is possible to understand the marginal distributions on σ X and σ Y in more detail (see appendix A). In any case, having an explicit formula for ν is not necessary for obtaining our main result on feasible pay-off regions, which we turn to in the next section.
(c) Feasible pay-off regions
By looking at the feasible region of a strategy, we uncover a nice relationship between a memoryone strategy, p, and its corresponding (linear) reactive learning strategy, p * . Namely, for every p ∈ Mem 1 X , we have C(p * ) ⊆ C(p). In this section, we give a proof of this fact and illustrate some of its consequences.
For t 1, let H t = ({C, D} 2 ) t be the history of play from time 0 through time t − 1 [12] . When t = 0, H 0 = {∅}, where ∅ denotes the 'empty' history, indicating that no play came before the present encounter. A behavioural strategy for a player specifies, for every possible history of play, a probability of using C in the next encounter. That is, if H := t 0 H t , then a behavioural strategy is a map H → [0, 1]. The following lemma shows that when considering the feasible region of a memory-one or reactive learning strategy, one can assume without a loss of generality that the opponent is playing a Markov strategy. For any y) y (ht,(xt,yt) 
Therefore, the same sequence of distributions {μ t } t 0 arises when Y uses the Markov strategy defined by q t+1 x t y t y t+1 := h t ∈H t y (ht,(xt,yt) 
.
(3.11)
If p * : [0, 1] × {C, D} → [0, 1] is a reactive learning strategy that X uses against y ∈ B, then for every t 0 there are distributions ν t on {C, D} 2 , χ t on [0, 1], and ν t on
Consider the Markov strategy for Y with q 0 := y ∅ and q 1 x 0 y 0 (y 1 ) := y (x 0 ,y 0 ) (y 1 ). For t 1, let
. (3.13) If ν t and χ t are the analogues of ν t and χ t for p * against {q t } t 1 , then clearly ν t = ν t and χ t = χ t for t = 0, 1. Suppose that for some t 1, we have ν t = ν t and χ t = χ t . It follows, then, that at time t + 1,
which gives the desired result for x ∈ RL X .
This lemma leads to a straightforward proof of our main result:
Proof. By lemma 3.2, for x ∈ RL X , we may assume the opponent's strategy is Markovian, meaning that it has a memory of one round into the past but can depend on the current round, t. This dependence on t distinguishes a Markov strategy from a memory-one strategy, the latter of which also has memory of one round into the past but is independent of t. We denote by M the set of all Markov strategies (equation (3.9)).
Let p * be a linear reactive learning strategy for X and suppose that y ∈ M. For every t 0, these strategies generate a distribution ν * t over {C, D} 2 × [0, 1]. For any strategy q against p, there is a sequence of distributions μ t on {C, D} 2 generated by these two strategies. We prove the proposition by finding
Let χ t be the (marginal) distribution on σ t X ∈ [0, 1] at time t. For y t ∈ {C, D}, denote by χ t (· | y t ) this distribution conditioned on Y using action y t at time t. For t 0, consider the strategy with q 0 := y ∅ and q t+1
Cy t y t+1 :=
and q t+1 Dy t y t+1 :=
p Cy t x t+1 q t+1 Cy t y t+1 μ t C, y t + p Dy t x t+1 q t+1 Dy t y t+1 μ t D, y t = y t ∈{C,D}
Therefore, by induction and the definition of expected pay-off in an iterated game, C(p * ) ⊆ C(p).
As a consequence of theorem 3.3, we see that p * enforces a linear pay-off relationship [1] whenever p does. However, the converse need not hold; figure 5(b) gives an example in which X's pay-off is a function of Y's when X uses p * but not when X uses p. Although this example illustrates an extreme case of when the pay-off region collapses, perhaps the most interesting behaviour is illustrated by figure 5a,c,d. In these examples, we focus on the pay-off regions that can be obtained against memory-one opponents. Using p * instead of p can both bias pay-offs in favour of X and limit potential losses against a spiteful opponent. Figure 5 . Simulated pay-offs against a fixed memory-one strategy, p (grey), and its corresponding reactive learning strategy, p * (green), as the opponent plays 10 5 randomly chosen strategies q ∈ Mem 1 X . (a) If the opponent is greedy and wishes to optimize his or her own pay-off only, then upon exploring the space Mem 1 X for sufficiently long, the pay-offs will end up at the black point when X uses p and at the magenta point when X uses p * . In this scenario, p favours Y having a higher pay-off than X, while p * favours X having a higher pay-off than Y. Thus, p * extorts a pay-off-maximizing opponent while p is more generous. (b) The pay-offs against p * (green) can fall along a line even when those against p (grey) form a two-dimensional region. In (c), by using p * instead of p, X can limit the pay-off the opponent receives from the black point to the magenta point. Similarly, in (d), X can limit the potential 'punishment' incurred from Y. When X uses p, the opponent can choose a strategy that gives X a negative pay-off (black point). When X uses p * , no such strategy of the opponent exists, and the worst pay-off X can possibly receive is positive (magenta point). The parameters used are (a) p = (0.90, 0.50, 0.01, 0.20, 0.90) and R = 2, S = −1, T = 1 and P = 1/2; (b) p = (1.0000, 0.6946, 0.0354, 0.1168, 0.3889) and R = 3, S = 1, T = 2 and P = 0; (c) p = (0.8623, 0.6182, 0.9528, 0.5601, 0.0001) and R = 3, S = 0, T = 5 and P = 1; and (d) p = (0.5626, 0.2381, 0.7236, 0.9537, 0.1496) and R = 1/2, S = −3/2, T = 2 and P = 3/2. Each coordinate of q is chosen independently from an arcsine (i.e. Beta(1/2, 1/2)) distribution. (Online version in colour.)
For a memory-one strategy p ∈ Mem 1 X , we can ask how the region {(π Y (p, q), π X (p, q))} q∈Mem 1 X compares to {(π Y (p * , q * ), π X (p * , q * ))} q∈Mem 1 X . In other words, does the map p → p * transform the feasible region of a strategy when the opponents are also subjected to this map? Figure 6 demonstrates that this map can significantly distort the distribution of pay-offs within the feasible region. Figure 6 . Distortions in the distribution of pay-offs against reactive learning strategies. In both panels, the grey region is formed by playing 10 5 randomly chosen strategies q ∈ Mem 1 X against a fixed strategy p ∈ Mem 1 X . The green region in (a) arises from simulating the pay-offs of p * against 10 5 strategies q ∈ Mem 1 X . In (b), this same reactive learning strategy, p * , is simulated against 10 5 strategies q * ∈ RL X for q ∈ Mem 1 X . In both panels, the optimal outcome for Y is the black point when X uses p and the magenta point when X uses p * . The magenta point represents a much better outcome for X and only a slightly worse outcome for Y than the black point, indicating that p * is highly extortionate relative to p when played against a payoff-maximizing opponent. In both panels, the parameters are p = (0.50, 0.99, 0.40, 0.01, 0.01) and R = 3, S = 0, T = 5 and P = 1. Each coordinate of q is chosen independently from an arcsine (i.e. Beta(1/2, 1/2)) distribution. (Online version in colour.) In each panel, X's strategy is fixed with parameters p = (0.50, 0.99, 0.40, 0.01, 0.01). Y chooses an initial memory-one strategy, q, from an arcsine distribution. At each update step, Y samples another strategy, q , from the same distribution. If Y's pay-off for playing q against X exceeds that of playing q against X, then Y replaces his or her current strategy with q . Otherwise, q is discarded and Y retains q. Over time, this process generates a sequence of pay-off pairs for X and Y, shown in (a,b). Relative to p, the reactive learning strategy p * is highly extortionate. (Online version in colour.)
(d) Optimization through mutation
Suppose that X uses a fixed reactive learning strategy, p * , for some p ∈ Mem 1 X . Starting from some random memory-one strategy, q, the opponent might seek to optimize his or her pay-off through a series of mutations. In other words, Y is subjected to the following process. First, sample a new strategy q ∈ Mem 1 X . If the pay-off to Y for q against p * exceeds that of q against p * , switch to q ; otherwise, retain q. This step then repeats until Y has a sufficiently high pay-off (or else has not changed strategies in some fixed number of steps). From figure 6 , one expects this process to give different results from the same update scheme when X plays the memory-one strategy p instead of p * .
As expected, figure 7 shows that this optimization process behaves quite differently against p * as it does against p. Whereas using p in this example results in equitable outcomes, using p * gives X a much higher pay-off than Y, indicating extortionate behaviour. One can also imagine other optimization procedures (not covered here), such as when q is always sufficiently close to q (i.e. local mutations). When X uses p * , a path from the red point to the magenta point in figure 6 through random local sampling of q typically requires Y to initially accept lower pay-offs. If Y uses q * instead of q, as in figure 6b, this effect is amplified.
Discussion
Our primary focus has been on the feasible region generated by a fixed strategy. This approach to studying X's strategy is inspired by the 'zero-determinant' strategies of Press & Dyson [1] , which enforce linear subsets of the feasible region. This perspective has also been expanded to cover socalled partner and rival strategies [2] [3] [4] , which have proven extremely useful in understanding repeated games from an evolutionary perspective. The feasible region of a memory-one strategy, p, is quite simple and can be characterized as the convex hull of at most 11 points. Furthermore, these points are all straightforward to write down explicitly in terms of the pay-off matrix and the entries of p (see equation (2.6) ). The feasible region of a reactive learning strategy, in terms of its boundary and extreme points, is evidently more complicated in general.
Both memory-one and reactive learning strategies contain the set of all reactive strategies. For every memory-one strategy, p, there exists a corresponding linear reactive learning strategy, p * , and this correspondence defines an injective map Mem 1 X → RL X . In general, however, p cannot be identified with its image, p * , unless p is reactive. We make this claim formally using the geometry of a strategy within the feasible region, C(p), which captures all possible pay-off pairs against an opponent. For any memory-one strategy, we have C(p * ) ⊆ C(p). Therefore, reactive learning strategies generally allow a player to impose greater control over where pay-offs fall within the feasible region than do traditional memory-one strategies. As illustrated in figure 5a, this added control can prevent a greedy, self-pay-off-maximizing opponent from obtaining more than X when X uses p * , even when such an opponent receives an unfair share of the pay-offs when X uses p instead. The proof of the containment C(p * ) ⊆ C(p) also extends to discounted games, where each pay-off unit received t rounds into the future is valued at δ t units at present for some 'discounting factor', δ ∈ [0, 1].
Another property of the map Mem 1 X → RL X sending p to p * is that it distorts the distribution of pay-offs within the feasible region. Since Mem 1 X can be identified with the space of linear reactive learning strategies under this map, it is natural to compare the region of possible pay-offs when p plays against memory-one strategies to the one obtained from when p * plays against linear reactive learning strategies. These distortions, as illustrated in figure 6 , are particularly relevant when X plays against an opponent who is using a process such as simulated annealing to optimize pay-off. One can see from this example that if Y initially has a low pay-off, then with localized strategy exploration they must be willing to accept lower pay-offs before they find a strategy that improves their initial pay-off. This concern is not relevant when Y can simply compute the best response to X's strategy, but it is highly pertinent to evolutionary settings in which the opponent's strategy is obtained through mutation and selection rather than 'computation'.
Reactive learning strategies are also more intuitive than memory-one strategies in some ways. Rather than being a dictionary of mixed actions based on all possible observed outcomes, a reactive learning strategy is simply an algorithm for updating one's tendency to choose a certain action. It, therefore, allows a player to alter their behaviour (mixed action) over time in response to various stimuli (actions of the opponent). This strategic approach to iterated games is reminiscent of both the Bush-Mosteller model [19] and the weighted majority algorithm [23] , although traditionally these models are not studied through the pay-off regions they generate in iterated games. There are several interesting directions for future research in this area. For one, we have mainly considered the space of linear reactive learning strategies, but the space RL X is much larger and could potentially exhibit complicated evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, one could relax the condition that these strategies be reactive and allow them to use X's realized action in addition to X's mixed action. But even without these complications, we have seen that linear reactive learning strategies have quite interesting relationships to traditional memory-one strategies.
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Furthermore, we have the following, straightforward convergence result.
Proposition A.1. If (p C , p D ), (q C , q D ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 , and if (σ X , σ Y ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 is given by equation (A 4) , then
for any initial condition, (p 0 , q 0 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 .
Proof. For (p C , p D ), (q C , q D ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 , consider the map In particular, if μ :
, then a straightforward calculation shows that μ is the stationary distribution of M((p C , p D , p C , p D ), (q C , q D , q C , q D )) (equation (2.2)).
Remark A.2. Proposition A.1 need not hold if p y and q x are not strictly between 0 and 1. For example, when X and Y both play TFT, f is a simple involution with f (x, y) = (y, x), which preserves distance.
Consider now the case of general memory-one strategies with p •• := (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) for X and q •• := (q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ) for Y. For these strategies, the system defined by equation (A1) has the form
In the spirit of proposition A.1, for fixed p •• , q •• ∈ (0, 1) 4 , we could consider the map and analyse its fixed points. At this point, however, a couple of remarks are in order:
